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We show that the resolution of social dilemmas in random graphs and scale-free networks is facilitated by
imitating not the strategy of better-performing players but, rather, their emotions. We assume sympathy and
envy to be the two emotions that determine the strategy of each player in any given interaction, and we define
them as the probabilities of cooperating with players having a lower and a higher payoff, respectively. Starting
with a population where all possible combinations of the two emotions are available, the evolutionary process
leads to a spontaneous fixation to a single emotional profile that is eventually adopted by all players. However,
this emotional profile depends not only on the payoffs but also on the heterogeneity of the interaction network.
Homogeneous networks, such as lattices and regular random graphs, lead to fixations that are characterized by
high sympathy and high envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest sympathy but also low envy.
Our results thus suggest that public emotions and the propensity to cooperate at large depend, and are in fact
determined by, the properties of the interaction network.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.87.042805 PACS number(s): 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games [1] have recently received ample
attention in the physics community, as it became obvious
that methods of statistical physics can be used successfully
also to study interactions that are more complex than just
those between particles [2]. Broadly classified as statistical
physics of social dynamics [3], these studies aim to elevate our
understanding of collective phenomena in society on a level
that is akin to the understanding we have about interacting
particle systems. Within the theoretical framework of evolu-
tionary games, the evolution of cooperation [4] is probably
the most interesting collective phenomenon to study. Several
evolutionary games constitute so-called social dilemmas [5],
the most prominent of which is the prisoner’s dilemma game,
in which understanding the evolution of cooperation is still a
grand challenge. Regardless of game particularities, a social
dilemma implies that the collective well-being is at odds with
individual success. An individual is therefore tempted to act
so as to maximize his or her own profit but, at the same time,
neglecting negative consequences this has for the society as
a whole. A frequently quoted consequence of such selfish
actions is the “tragedy of the commons” [6]. While cooperation
is regarded as the strategy leading away from the threatening
social decline, it is puzzling why individuals would choose to
sacrifice some fraction of personal benefits for the well-being
of society.
According to Nowak [7], five rules promote the evolution
of cooperation. These are kin selection, direct and indirect
reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. Recent
reviews [8–11] clearly attest to the fact that physics-inspired
research has helped refine many of these concepts. In par-
ticular, evolutionary games in networks, spurred on by the
seminal discovery of spatial reciprocity [12] and, subsequently,
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by the discovery that scale-free networks strongly facilitate
the evolution of cooperation [13,14], are still receiving ample
attention to this day [15–34]. One of the most recent contribu-
tions to the subject concerns the assignment of cognitive skills
to individuals that engage in evolutionary games in networks
[35,38–41]. The earliest forerunners to these advances can be
considered strategies such as “tit for tat” [42] and Pavlov [43],
many of which were already proposed during the seminal
experiments performed by Axelrod [44] and which assume that
individuals have cognitive skills that exceed those granted to
them in the framework of classical game theory. It has recently
been shown, for example, that incipient cognition solves
several open questions related to network reciprocity and that
cognitive strategies are particularly fit to take advantage of the
ability of heterogeneous networks to promote the evolution of
cooperation [39].
Here we build on our previous work [35], where we have
presented the idea that not strategies but, rather, emotions could
be the subject of imitation during the evolutionary process.
It is worth noting that the transmissive nature of positive
and negative emotional states was already observed in [36],
where it was concluded that humans really do adjust their
emotions depending on their contacts in a social network.
Moreover, the connection between intuition and willingness
to cooperate was also tested in human experiments [37]. It
therefore is of interest to determine how the topology of the
interaction network affects the spreading of emotions, which
may in turn determine the level of cooperation. In the context
of games on lattices, we have shown that imitating emotions
such as goodwill and envy from the more successful players
reinstalls imitation as a tour de force for resolving social
dilemmas, even for games where the Nash equilibrium is a
mixed phase. We have also argued that envy is an important
inhibitor of cooperative behavior. We now revisit the snowdrift,
stag-hunt, and prisoner’s dilemma games in random graphs
and scale-free networks, with the aim of determining the role
of interaction heterogeneity within this framework. We focus
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on sympathy and envy as the two key emotions determining
the emotional profile of each player, and we define them
simply as the probability of cooperating with less and more
successful opponents, respectively. Strategies thus become
link specific rather than player specific, whereby the level of
cooperation in the population can be determined by the average
number of times players choose to cooperate. Interestingly,
in agreement with a recent experiment, we find that network
reciprocity plays a negligible role [45]. The outcome in regular
random graphs is the same as reported previously for the
square lattice, leading to the conclusion that the ability of
cooperators to aggregate into spatially compact clusters is
irrelevant. Only when degree heterogeneity is introduced to
interaction networks do we find that the evolution of emotional
profiles changes. As we show, homogeneous networks lead to
fixations that are characterized by high sympathy and high
envy, while heterogeneous networks lead to low or modest
sympathy and low envy. Network heterogeneity thus alleviates
a key impediment to higher levels of cooperation in lattices
and regular networks, namely, envy, and by doing so opens
the possibility of much more cooperative states even under
extremely adverse conditions. From a different point of view,
it can be argued that some topological features of interaction
networks in fact determine the emotional profiles of players,
and they do so in such a way that cooperation is the most
frequently chosen strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
First, we describe the mathematical model, in particular, the
protocol for the imitation of emotional profiles as well as the
definition of social dilemmas in networks. Next we present
the main results, and finally, we summarize and discuss their
implications.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The traditional setup of an evolutionary game assumes
N players occupying vertices of an interaction network.
Moreover, each player x, having a pure strategy, cooperates
(sx = C) or defects (sx = D) with all neighbors independently
of their strategy and payoff. Here, instead of pure strategies,
we introduce an emotional profile (αx,βx) ∈ [0.1] to each
player, which characterizes the willingness to cooperate with
a neighbor dependent on the other player’s success, which
is quantified by the payoff value. More precisely, if the
corresponding payoff values are px and py for players x
and y, respectively, then αx determines the probability that
player x will cooperate with player y in the case of px > py .
Conversely, when px < py , the parameter βx is the probability
that player x will cooperate with player y. In the rare case
of equality (px = py), the corresponding probability is the
average of αx and βx .
In this way the (αx,βx) pair thus determines how a given
player x will behave when facing a less or a more successful
opponent y. As described in Sec. I, the pair determines each
player’s sympathy and envy. If αx = 1, we say that the player
is completely sympathetic. Alternative interpretations such as
goodwill and charity are also viable, given that player x will
always cooperate with less successful opponents. Similarly, if
β = 1, we say that the player is not envious. Despite the fact
that the opponents are more successful, the player will always
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Map depicting the final values of α (left)
and β (right) on the T -S parameter plane, as obtained in a regular
random graph. The results are strikingly similar to those obtained on
a square lattice (see [35]).
cooperate with them. As by αx , alternatives such as servility
and proneness to brownnose or “butter up” appear to fit as
well. It is important to note that a player x may simultaneously
cooperate with and defect towards neighbors y and y ′ if their
payoffs are very different. Furthermore, player x may adopt
different strategies even if py ≈ py′ due to the probabilistic
nature of an emotional profile.
When two players engage in a round of an evolutionary
game, we assume that mutual cooperation yields the reward
R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and the mixed
choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the
defector the temptation T . Within this traditional setup we
have the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game if T > R > P > S,
the snowdrift game (SG) if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt
(SH) game if R > T > P > S, thus covering all three major
social dilemma types where players can choose between
cooperation and defection. Following common practice [8],
we set R = 1 and P = 0, thus leaving the remaining two
payoffs to occupy −1  S  1 and 0  T  2, as depicted
schematically in Fig. 1(a).
To begin, each player x is assigned a random (αx,βx) pair
and a payoff from the reachable [kS,kT ] interval, where k de-
notes the average degree of players. Subsequently, every payoff
value is updated by considering the proper neighborhoods of a
player and the actual emotional parameters. Importantly, after
the accumulation of new payoffs, player y cannot imitate a
pure strategy from player x, but only its emotional profile, i.e.,
the αx and/or βx value. Imitation is decided so that a randomly
selected player x first acquires its payoff px by playing the
game with all its kx neighbors, as defined by the interaction
network. Note that kx is thus the degree of player x. Next,
one randomly chosen partner of x, denoted y, also acquires its
payoff py by playing the game with all its ky neighbors. Player
y then attempts to imitate the emotional profile of players x
with the probability q = 1/{1 + exp[(py − px)/K]}, where K
determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions [8].
The latter can be attributed to errors in judgment due to
mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation
of the opponent. Without loss of generality we set K = 0.5,
implying that better-performing players are readily imitated,
but it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player
performing worse. Importantly, since the emotional profile
consists of two parameters, two random numbers are drawn
to enable independent imitation of αx and βx . This is vital
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to avoid potential artificial propagations of freak (extremely
successful) (αx,βx) pairs. Technically, 100 × 100 (αx,βx) pairs
were available at the start of the evolutionary process. Finally,
after each imitation the payoff of player y is updated using
its new emotional profile, whereby each full Monte Carlo step
involves all players having a chance to adopt the emotional
profile from one of their neighbors once on average.
Prior to presenting the result of this model, it is important to
note that there will almost always be a fixation of (αx,βx) pairs;
i.e., irrespective of T and S, only a single pair will eventually
spread across the whole population. Once fixation occurs the
evolutionary process stops. The characteristic probability of
encountering cooperative behavior in the population, which
is equivalent to the stationary fraction of cooperators fC in
the traditional version of the game, can then be determined
by means of averaging over the final states that emerge
from different initial conditions. Exceptions to single (α,β)
pair fixations are likely to occur for strongly heterogeneous
networks, where more than one (αx,βx) pair can survive around
strong hubs. This effect is more pronounced in the harmony
game (HG) quadrant but becomes negligible in the prisoner’s
dilemma parametrization of the game. In case more than a
single (αx,βx) pair does survive, we present in what follows
the average over several independent realizations. For Monte
Carlo simulations, we have used N = 5000–40 000 players
and up to 107 full steps, and we have averaged over 100–500
independent runs.
III. RESULTS
We start by presenting results obtained in a regular random
graph [46] with k = 4, as it is a natural extension of a simple
square lattice population which we have considered before,
in [35]. Importantly, while the degree distribution remains uni-
form, other topological features, like the presence of shortcuts
and the emergence of a nonzero clustering coefficient, change
significantly. Previous work on games using pure strategies
emphasized that these details may play a significant role via the
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas [47–49]. Figure 1
is a color map encoding the fixation values of α (left) and
β (right) on the T -S parameter plane. From the presented
results it follows that if the governing social dilemma is
of the snowdrift type, players will always (never) cooperate
with their neighbors provided their payoff is lower (higher).
In the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant, we can observe either
complete dominance of defection, regardless of the status
of the opponents, or the same situation as in the snowdrift
quadrant, provided S is not too negative. For the stag-hunt
and the harmony games the outcome is practically identical
to that obtained by means of the traditional version of the
two games. In general, however, both color profiles differ only
insignificantly from those ones we reported in [35] (see Figs. 2
and 3 there) for a square lattice. This leads to the conclusion
that the structure of interactions does not play a prominent role
as long as the degree of all players is uniform.
This leads us to suspect that the heterogeneity of interac-
tions might play a pivotal role. We therefore depart from the
regular random graph and move to random graphs with differ-
ent degree distributions, as depicted in Fig. 2. We consider four
types of random graphs with Gaussian-distributed degrees, yet
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Degree distributions of random graphs
with a gradually increasing variance of degree (σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < σ4).
For easier reference the envelopes of discrete degree distributions are
depicted as well.
with increasing variance. According to the legend to Fig. 2,
the random graph with σ1 is thus the least heterogeneous (only
degrees k = 3, 4, and 5 are possible), while the random graph
with σ4 is the most heterogeneous. Gradually increasing the
variance from σ1 to σ4 thus enables us to monitor directly the
consequences of heterogeneity stemming from the interaction
network.
Color maps encoding the fixation values of α and β for
the four random graphs are depicted in Fig. 3. By following
the plots from left to right, it can be observed that as the
heterogeneity of the interaction network increases, the fixation
of the profiles of both α and β change. Focusing on the
snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma quadrants, there is a
gradual shift from high-α, low-β emotional profiles to low α
and high β values as the heterogeneity increases. Accordingly,
taking into account also results presented in Fig. 1, we
conclude that homogeneous interaction networks promote
emotions like sympathy and envy (α → 1 and β → 0), while
heterogeneous interaction networks prefer indifference and
servility (α → 0 and β → 1). It is worth emphasizing that
these emotional profiles emerge completely spontaneously
based on payoff-driven imitation. The change is thus brought
about exclusively by the heterogeneity of the interaction
network.
It is possible to take a step farther in terms of the
heterogeneity of the interaction network by considering scale-
free networks. We therefore make use of the standard model
proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [50]. Results presented in
Fig. 4 further support our arguments, as the region of low and
moderate α values extends farther into the snowdrift quadrant,
while at the same time low β values vanish more and more
from both the snowdrift and the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant.
As before, the harmony game and the stag-hunt quadrants
remain relatively unaffected, which corroborates the fact that
the proposed shift from the imitation of strategies to the
imitation of emotional profiles affect predominantly the social
dilemma games. It is also worth remembering that on scale-free
networks the fixation may not be unique because different hubs
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Maps depicting the final values of α (top) and β (bottom) on the T -S parameter plane, as obtained in random graphs
with a degree distribution as depicted in Fig. 2. From left to right the variance increases from σ1 to σ2 to σ3 to σ4 and, hence, increases also the
network heterogeneity. It can be observed that the higher the heterogeneity, the more the high-α, low-β emotional profiles give way to profiles
that are characterized by low α and high β values. The transition is particularly pronounced in the snowdrift (SD) and the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) quadrant, while for the stag-hunt (SH) and the harmony game (HG) the outcome remains little affected.
can sustain their own microenvironment independently from
the other hubs. We therefore depict an average over several
independent realizations to arrive at representative results.
In order to obtain an understanding of the preference
for low α and high β values, as exerted by heterogeneous
interaction networks, it is of interest to examine the time
evolution of α and β values, as depicted in Fig. 5. The
figure shows the probability of any given (α,β) pair in the
population at different times increasing from top left to bottom
right. It can be observed that high-α/high-β combinations die
out first. These players cooperate with both their more and
their less successful opponents, and they do so with a high
α
 0  1  2
T
-1
 0
 1
S
 0.0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1.0
β
 0  1  2
T
-1
 0
 1
S
 0.0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1.0
FIG. 4. (Color online) Map depicting the final values of α
(left) and β (right) on the T -S parameter plane, as obtained in a
scale-free network. The dominance of low and moderate α values
and high β values is even more pronounced than for the random
graph with degree distribution σ4 (compare with the two rightmost
panels in Fig. 3). This further strengthens the conclusion that, unlike
homogeneous networks, strong heterogeneity strongly favors the
fixation of emotional profiles that are characterized by low α and
high β values.
probability. In agreement with well-known results concerning
the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas [8],
the bulk of cooperators is always the first to die out. Only
after their arrangement into suitable compact domains can
the cooperators take advantage of network reciprocity and
prevail against defectors. In our case, however, this does not
happen; i.e., the “always cooperate” players never recover.
Instead, the evolution proceeds by eliminating also all pairs
which contain moderate and high α values until, finally, the
only surviving low-α profiles are left to compete. However,
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Time evolution of fixation of α and β,
as obtained for T = 1.5 and S = −0.1 in the scale-free network.
From top left to bottom right we have the temporary distribution of
(αx,βx) pairs at 1, 100, 1000, and 100 000 full Monte Carlo steps
using N = 5000 players. It can be observed that high values of α are
the first to vanish. Then gradually the remaining low β values also
give way to the complete dominance of low-α and high-β emotional
profiles.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Map depicting the final probability of
cooperative behavior fC on the T -S parameter plane, as obtained
in the regular random graph (left) and the scale-free network (right).
Since the probability of cooperating should be seen to be equal to
the stationary fraction of cooperators in the traditional version of
the game, a comparison of presented results (compare with Fig. 1
in [35]) reveals that replacing the imitation of strategies with the
imitation of emotional profiles strongly promotes the evolution of
cooperation—even more so if the interaction network is strongly
heterogeneous.
preserving at least some form of cooperation may yield an
evolutionary advantage, and thus ultimately the low-α/high-β
emotional profile emerges as the only one remaining. Notably,
the described scenario is characteristic only for heterogeneous
networks. For homogeneous networks the differences between
players are more subtle, and indeed it is not at all obvious that
cooperating with more successful neighbors would confer an
evolutionary advantage. Accordingly, high-β profiles are not
viable and die out. Cooperation can thrive only atn the expense
of high α values, as reported in [35].
Importantly, though, given an appropriately heterogeneous
interaction network, the low-α/high-β emotional profile can
be very beneficial for the global cooperation level. To support
this statement, we present in Fig. 6 the average frequency of
cooperation as obtained in the regular random graph (left) and
the scale-free network (right). Note that the former, in general,
represents homogeneous graphs. The comparison reveals that
a much higher cooperation level can be sustained, especially
in the snowdrift quadrant, if the dominating emotion is neither
sympathy nor envy. To confirm this further, we have manually
imposed a high-α/low-β emotional profile in the scale-free
network. While this profile is optimal for homogeneous
networks (compare also Fig. 6 (left) with Fig. 4 in [35]), the
outcome in heterogeneous networks is disappointing, yielding
no more than the modest cooperation level of fC ≈ 0.30–0.35
in the most challenging snowdrift and prisoner’s dilemma
regions. This imposes another interesting conclusion, namely,
if the emotional profiles of players can evolve freely as dictated
by payoff-driven imitation microscopic dynamics, then the
topology “selects” the optimal profile in order to produce the
highest attainable cooperation level.
Finally, it is instructive to explore how the low-α/high-β
emotional profile actually works in scale-free networks. A
visualization is possible by measuring separately the average
willingness to cooperate for players who have different
degrees. Since the payoff of every player is obtained from
the pairwise interaction constituted by each individual link, a
higher degree k therefore, in general, leads to a higher payoff
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Average willingness to cooperate depen-
dent on degree, as obtained for T = 1.5 and S = −0.1 in the
scale-free network. Fully in agreement with the dominant low-α and
high-β emotional profile, it can be observed that hubs very rarely
cooperate, while masses almost always do so. The depicted result is
an average over 500 independent runs at N = 5000 after 107 Monte
Carlo steps. The average cooperation level is ≈0.6.
and also a higher “social prestige.” As Fig. 7 illustrates, players
with a low degree will predominantly cooperate with their
opponents that have a higher degree and thus most likely a
higher payoff. In other words, they can use the “β part” of
their emotional profile. This act of cooperation, however, is
unilateral because the hubs rarely compensate it. Due to the
low values of α, cooperation with less successful players is
strongly suppressed. What is more, while players with a higher
degree also cooperate with more successful opponents (they
have the same emotional profile and hence the same high β),
this action is very rare given that there are simply not many
who would be superior. It is sad but still true that the hubs
with the highest degree very rarely cooperate in the stationary
state. Despite this rather unfriendly behavior of the “leaders,”
the average cooperation level is still acceptable and, in fact,
remarkably high even under adverse conditions (e.g., T = 1.5
and S = −0.1), but this is exclusively because the inferior
players do their best and virtually always cooperate with their
superiors.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have shown that high levels of cooperation can evolve
among self-interested individuals if, instead of strategies,
they adopt simple emotional profiles from their neighbors.
Since the imitation was governed solely by the payoffs of
players, we have made no additional assumptions concerning
the microscopic dynamics. The latter has been governed
by the traditional “follow the more successful” rule, which
we have implemented with some leeway due to the Fermi
function. Starting from an initial configuration with all possible
emotional profiles, we have determined the one that remains
after sufficiently long relaxation (only in the harmony game
quadrant, if staged in heterogeneous networks, may the fixation
be nonunique). We have found that the fixation depends not
only on the parametrization of the game but, even more so, on
the topology of the interaction network. More precisely, the
topology-induced heterogeneity of players has been identified
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as the most important property. When players were staged in
a network where their degree was equal, then, independently
of other topological properties of the network, the fixation
occurred on emotional profiles characterized by high α and
low β values in the interesting payoff region. In agreement
with the definition of α and β, these are players characterized
by high sympathy but also high envy. This profile is also in
agreement with the one reported in [35] for the square lattice.
In heterogeneous networks, however, the fixation is most
likely to be on low or moderate values of α and high values
of β. Accordingly, we have a prevalence of low sympathy
(charity, goodwill) for those who are doing worse, but also
little envy (high servility, proneness to brownnose or “suck
up”) of those who are doing better. Noteworthily, although we
have not presented actual results, the application of payoffs
normalized by the degree of players gives the same results
as observed in homogeneous networks. This observation is
in agreement with our preliminary expectation because it
is well established that the scale-free topology introduces a
strong heterogeneity among players, but also that this effect
is effectively diminished by applying normalized payoffs or
degree-sensitive cost [51–55]. Accordingly, in the latter case
players become “equal,” which results in the selection of
the emotional profile we have recorded for regular graphs.
This observation further strengthens our argument that indeed
solely the heterogeneity of players is crucial for the selection
of the dominant emotional profile.
We thus may argue that in heterogeneous networks each
“dictators’ dream” profile can evolve via a simple evolutionary
rule. The majority may not be happy about it because the
combination of moderate α and high β values is not necessarily
the most coveted personality profile. Yet as our study shows,
it does have its social advantages. Namely, in the absence of
envy or in the presence of servility the cooperation level in the
whole population can be maintained relatively very high, even
if the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are extremely
adverse (high T , low S). In this sense, we conclude that
charity and envy are easily outperformed by competitiveness
and proneness to please the dominant players and that, indeed,
this profile emerges completely spontaneously. Put differently,
it can be argued that it is in fact chosen by the heterogeneity
among players that is introduced by an appropriate interaction
network.
We would also like to emphasize that the discussed
“emotional profiles” do not necessarily cover the broader
psychological interpretation of the term [56]. We have used
this terminology to express the liberty of each individual
to act differently towards different partners dependent on
the differences in social rank (or success), which traditional
strategies in the context of evolutionary games do not allow.
As such, and in the absence of considering further details
determining our personality, our very simple model naturally
cannot be held accountable for describing actual human
behavior. Instead, it reveals the topology of interactions as
a crucial property that determines the collective behavior of
a social network. According to our observations, it is indeed
the heterogeneity of the interaction network that is key in
determining our willingness to help others.
Finally, we emphasize that in the present model cooperation
is maintained without reciprocity. The mechanism at work here
is very different from those discussed thoroughly in previous
studies. Unlike direct and indirect reciprocity, network reci-
procity, or even reputation, punishment, and reward, which
are all deeply rooted in the fact that neighboring cooperators
will help each other out while, at the same time, neighboring
defectors will craft their own demise, here the nature of links
determines the winner. It may well happen that cooperation
and defection occur along the same link, yet the status of the
population as a whole is still very robust. What players really
share is the way to behave towards each other in different
circumstances, which is determined within the framework of
an emotional profile.
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